Threats to energy transition embodied in global supply chains under extreme geopolitical scenarios
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GRAPHICAL ABSTRACT
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PUBLIC SUMMARY
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We develop a Conflict-Supply Chain-Effect (CSE) model to capture the cascading pathways of trade shocks.
First quantification of embodied renewable energy import losses under geopolitical conflict scenarios.
Trade disruptions exert uneven direct and spillover effects on conflict and third-party nations.
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ABSTRACT
Geopolitical conflicts may threaten energy transition embodied in global supply chains via disruptions to embodied renewable energy imports (EREM). Current studies predominantly focus on direct shocks to conventional energy trade, largely overlooking the vulnerabilities of EREM and failing to disentangle the cascading transmission pathways of these disruptions. Here, we develop a Conflict-Supply Chain-Effect (CSE) model to quantify EREM change for both conflict participants and third countries under two scenarios: an economic conflict (the China-US trade dispute) and an armed conflict (the Russia-Ukraine war). We find that the China-US dispute reduces global EREM by 4.1%, with the US facing a sharper loss (7.1 Mtoe) than China (1.5 Mtoe). In the Russia-Ukraine scenario, global EREM declines by 8%. Notably, losses from spillover effects are nearly double those from direct effects, causing substantial losses (3.8 Mtoe) even among non-conflict nations. Crucially, we demonstrate that import substitution strategies fail to significantly mitigate these losses; instead, they deepen the hidden dependencies between the US and China and the asymmetric reliance of Russia on sanctioning nations. Our findings underscore that the energy transition transcends environmental concerns to become a complex geopolitical issue and ensuring supply chain resilience is critical for a secure global energy future.-
Keywords:
- renewable energy /
- trade disputes /
- war /
- global supply chains /
- multi-regional input-output
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REFERENCES
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Cheng Y., Yang Y., Poon J. P.H., et al. (2026). Threats to energy transition embodied in global supply chains under extreme geopolitical scenarios. The Innovation Geoscience 4:100218. https://doi.org/10.59717/j.xinn-geo.2026.100218
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Cheng Y., Yang Y., Poon J. P.H., et al. (2026). Threats to energy transition embodied in global supply chains under extreme geopolitical scenarios. The Innovation Geoscience 4:100218. https://doi.org/10.59717/j.xinn-geo.2026.100218
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Content
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Figure 1.
CSE model overview
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Figure 2.
Changes in embodied renewable energy import (EREM) under the China-US domestic substitution scenario
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Figure 3.
Decomposition of EREM variations into direct and spillover effects for individual economies under the China-US domestic substitution scenario
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Figure 4.
Changes in embodied renewable energy import (EREM) under the Russia-Ukraine domestic substitution scenario
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Figure 5.
Decomposition of EREM variations into direct and spillover effects for individual economies under the Russia-Ukraine domestic substitution scenario
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Figure 6.
Geographic distribution of embodied renewable energy import (EREM) changes under China-US import substitution scenarios
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Figure 7.
Geographic distribution of embodied renewable energy import (EREM) changes under Russia-Ukraine import substitution scenarios
